Adkins v. Mireles, et. al.
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California
D.C. No.CV-98-00979-AHS
Cite No. 06-56005

USCA affirmed Company’s Labor Pre-emption Claim

The pertinent facts are as follows:

David Adkins and other former employees (Appellants) at Lucky Fullerton, California warehouse were all members of Teamsters Local 952 ("the Union").

Ed Mireles and Harry Ashley, (Appellees) were the secretary-treasurer and President of the Union- Teamsters Local 952, respectively.

In 1985, a strike by lucky employees, including members of the Union- Union- Teamsters Local 952, led to the settlement that left some warehouse employees unsatisfied. The settlement was controversial that led some employees of the Fullerton warehouse burned their teamster jackets in protest.

Appellants sought protective language in the CBA that would allow them to "follow their product," that is, to obtain an assurance from Lucky that if the Fullerton warehouse was closed and the product transferred, Appellants would continue to be employed by Lucky and transferred to the warehouse that received the transferred product.

Because of the incident, Ed Mireles negotiated with Lucky Fullerton in the absence of other Union- Teamsters Local 952 business agents and secured the protective language in the CBA for employees of the Buena Park and Irvine warehouses excluding the employees of the Lucky Fullerton warehouse.

In turn, Lucky Fullerton warehouse planned to close down the Fullerton facility in 1998 without allowing transfers to the larger planned replacement warehouse. Lucky gave the Union- Teamsters Local 952 jurisdiction over this new warehouse, which opened in La Habra, near the old Fullerton facility, in 1996.

Thus, in October 1998, Appellants filed a complaint in Orange County Superior Court (it was later removed to federal district court), for breach of the duty of fair representation, breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, fraud & deceit, intentional infliction of emotional distress, violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 ("RICO"), and conspiracy to commit RICO violations.

Specifically, in their complaint, the appellants made the following allegations:

• That by reason of the 1985-protest, Mireles harbored animosity toward the Fullerton warehouse employees for the next decade, then exacted revenge during a September 1994 Union-initiated negotiation with Lucky over the terms of a CBA, which was to cover the Fullerton warehouse, as well as others in Buena Park and Irvine, for the years 1994 to 1998.


• That Mireles represented to them, contrary to the actual terms of the CBA, that they could follow their product and that when Appellants were terminated from their employment at the Lucky warehouse in Fullerton in September 1998, Mireles refused to pursue their grievances.


• That the Appellees colluded with Lucky Fullerton to persuade the Appellants to accept a CBA that was substantially less protective of Appellants' rights than was represented to them.


• Appellants further maintained that Appellees were motivated by the Union's desire to secure Lucky Fullerton’s prospective cooperation in becoming the labor representative of a larger number of Lucky Fullerton’s employees, and by Mireles's long-harbored animosity toward Appellants.


• Appellants contended that the Union-Teamsters Local 952 negotiated a secret deal with Lucky Fullerton, which was not disclosed to them.


• That they ratified the 1994-98 CBA because they relied on material misrepresentations by the Union that Fullerton workers would be allowed to follow their product; and that the Union failed to represent them properly both in the 1994 CBA negotiations and 1998 negotiations about Lucky Fullerton’s closure of the Fullerton facility at which they worked.

The Appellees, in their part moved for summary judgment on all the causes of action, alleging that the claims were all pre-empted by federal law.

The federal district court, the United States District Court for the Central District of California granted the summary judgment in favor of Appellees on all but one claim, finding the other claims preempted by federal law. The remaining claim, for breach of the duty of fair representation, was decided after an 8-day jury trial.

Appellants appeal the ruling of the district Court to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

On appeal, the appellants contended that the district court erred by finding preemption as to the dismissed claims and as to the claim that went to trial by granting a motion in limine to exclude evidence of a 1985 incident in which two or more of the Appellants burned their teamster jackets.

In affirming the district court’s ruling, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held in these respects, thus:

• We hold that the district court did not err in holding that federal law preempts Appellants' breach of contract, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims because each implicates the duty of fair representation.


• The district court did not err in finding that the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA") § 301, 29U.S.C. § 185 preempts Appellants' fraud and deceit claim, because the claim cannot be maintained without the court interpreting the provisions of the CBA.


• The Appellants' RICO claims are preempted because Appellants alleged an unfair labor practice bargaining in bad faith which is prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") §§ 7 and 8, 29U.S.C. §§ 157 and 158, and thus under the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board


• The claim involved in this case is governed by federal law but may be tried in federal court.


• That the Appellants failed to perfect their challenge to the district court's evidentiary decision to exclude evidence regarding the jacket-burning incident for while Appellants proffered this evidence in limine, they did not attempt to introduce the evidence at trial.