Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons
Filed January 22, 2008
Cite as 06-9130

Federal Guards’ Immunity from Prisoner’s Tort Claims Affirmed

Abdus-Shahid M. S. Ali was a federal prisoner at the United States Penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia, from 2001 to 2003.  In December 2003, Ali temporarily left his two bags of possessions with a police officer before being transferred to a new prison. The bags will be sent to his new prison in Kentucky.

When the bags arrived, Ali noticed that several items were missing. Many of the missing items were of religious and nostalgic significance, which includes two copies of the Qur’an, a prayer rug, and religious magazines. The items were estimated to be worth $177.

As a result, Ali filed an administrative tort claim with the Bureau of Prisons seeking to recover the items. The agency denied Ali’s claims and noted that, by his signature on the receipt form, Ali had certified the accuracy of the inventory listed and had thereby relinquished any future claims relating to missing or damaged property.

After the claim was denied, Ali brought his case to the district court. The court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that the government had immunity from the lawsuit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA).

In ruling, the district court held the FTCA establishes a general waiver of sovereign immunity for tort claims against the government, essentially permitting plaintiffs to sue the federal government. However, it also makes several exceptions to the waiver; one of them includes "any claim arising in respect of [...] the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer."

Ali argued that in context the phrase "any other law enforcement officer" referred only to officers working in customs and related activities, thus permitting him to sue the prison officer who confiscated his property. But the court applied the exception to any detention of goods by any law enforcement officer.

Ali disagreed with the decision and appealed his case.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of Ali's claim. It ruled that the phrase "any other law enforcement officer" in the FTCA was not merely a supplementary catch-all relating to the government's immunity in tax collection and customs situations. Rather, it was itself a broad grant of sovereign immunity covering any instance of detention of goods by law enforcement officers.

Further, the Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court’s interpretation of §2680(c). 204 Fed. Appx. 778, 779–780 (2006) (per curiam).

In rejecting Ali’s arguments, the appeals court relied on the following:

• the interpretation of §2680(c)’s “detention” clause in Kosak v. United States, 465 U. S. 848, 854–859 (1984) ,


• on decisions by other Courts of Appeals


• on its own decision in Schlaebitz v. United States Dept. of Justice, 924 F. 2d 193, 195 (1991) (per curiam) (holding that United States Marshals, who were allegedly negligent in releasing a parolee’s luggage to a third party, were “law enforcement officers” under §2680(c)). (See 204 Fed. Appx., at 779–780)

In May 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court accepted review in the case, and allowed Ali to have his case heard without costs.

In ruling, the Supreme Court concluded that the statute preserved immunity for all federal law enforcement officers, not just those associated with customs or excise functions.

In a 5-4 opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote for the majority, which asserted the following facts:

• That the use of the word "any" should be given its normal interpretation, which encompassed all federal officers whether or not they were involved in enforcing customs or excise laws.


• That the canons of statutory interpretation ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis, which require a court to interpret a residual category following a list of specific examples consistent with the common theme of the specific examples, did not apply here.


• There was no list of specifics preceding the category "any other law enforcement officer," but just a single example.

Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Antonin Scalia, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Samuel Alito, joined Thomas's opinion.

Justice Anthony Kennedy was joined in dissent by Justices John Paul Stevens, David Souter and Stephen Breyer. Kennedy complained that the majority opinion misconstrued the longstanding canons of statutory interpretation and created confusion for lower courts that rely on them and read their decisions, not just on the Federal Tort Claims Act but on all federal laws.

Moreover, Kennedy observed that if Congress intended to immunize all federal law enforcement officers from tort immunity for property loss, it likely would have listed them first in the statute, and then added that quasi-law officers such as customs and excise officials, were also covered.

On the other hand, Justice Stephen Breyer also penned a dissent, joined by Justice John Paul Stevens. Breyer explained that even without referring to the rules of statutory interpretation (dealing with property loss and damage), the context of the statute made clear that it was designed to protect federal officials likely to deal with citizen property, such as customs and excise officials and other law enforcement officers pressed into service in enforcing similar laws.

Finally, the Supreme Court declined to expand prisoners' rights to sue their jailers under the Federal Tort Claims Act for lost or damaged property, therefore preserving the immunity of federal officers from Ali’s tort claim.