Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee

Filed January 26, 2009

Cite as No. 09-1595

High Court Reverses Decision on Sexual Harassment Case, Verdict Remanded

The case arose from a complaint filed by Vicky Crawford, a long-time employee of the Metropolitan government of Nashville and Davidson County, Tennessee.

The incident was brought about by an investigation of the city government into rumors of sexual harassment. During the investigation, Crawford was asked by a human resource officer whether “she had witnessed inappropriate behavior by another employee, Gene Hughes.

Crawford responded by telling the officer that he has witnessed some incidents involving Hughes and described it. As a result, Crawford, together with two other employees, was subsequently fired.

In response, Crawford filed for wrongful termination, claiming that her dismissal violated Title VII because it was in retaliation for reporting Hughes’ behavior.

The district court granted summary in favor of Metro, concluding that Title VII’s anti retaliation provision did not include the conduct at issue because Crawford had not instigated or initiated any complaint against Hughes but “merely answered questions” by the investigators.

On the other hand, during appeal, the Sixth Circuit upheld the decision, holding that the “opposition” under Title VII demand “active, consistent ‘opposing’ activities to warrant protection against discrimination”.

To resolve a conflict among the federal courts of appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The high court held that the "opposition clause” of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision is “broad enough to protect an employee who speaks out about discrimination when answering questions during an employer’s internal investigation, even though the employee did not initiate the complaint”.

Further, the Court concluded that providing a “disapproving account of an employee’s sexually obnoxious behavior” may qualify as resistant or antagonistic, citing an EEOC guideline, and observed that communicating a belief that an employer has engaged in employment discrimination virtually always constitutes opposition to that activity.

The Supreme Court therefore rejected the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the “opposition clause” as requiring active, consistent, opposing activities, including the initiation or instigation of a complaint. Under the rule announced today, opposition includes not only those who report discrimination on their own initiative, but also those who report discrimination in response to an investigator’s question. The Court expressly did not address the scope and reach of the “participation clause” under Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, which many observers expected the Court to do under the facts of the case.

The Supreme Court therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings, concluding that Crawford’s conduct is covered by the “opposition clause” of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision, which makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee “because he has opposed any practice made unlawful by this subchapter.” (42 U.S.C. section 2000e-3(a)