Golden v. CH2M Hill Hanford Group, Inc.
filed June 11, 2008
Cite as 05-35832

Court Upholds Injured Victim’s Right to Claim, Case Remanded

Petitioner Daniel Golden (Golden for brevity) worked at the Hanford Nuclear Facility operated by the CH2M Hill Hanford Group, Inc. (CH2M for brevity). On May 20, 2002, Golden was working on one of the large storage tanks containing liquid waste when almost 4 gallons of the liquid splashed on him. The toxic liquid is composed of radioactive materials and non-radioactive heavy metals.

Petitioner Daniel sued the respondent for damages on two grounds:

1. For his physical injuries ranging from colitis to sinusitis; and


2. For his emotional distress.

Cindy Daniel sued CH2M for loss of consortium.

The District Court, which has jurisdiction over cases under Price-Anderson Act (which preempts injury claims resulting from nuclear accidents), granted the summary judgment in favor of CH2M. The same court also dismissed petitioners’ claims for emotional distress and loss of consortium. Hence this appeal.

There are four main issues in this case:

1. Whether or not Golden can claim for damages for physical injuries suffered under the Price-Anderson Act;


2. Whether or not Golden can claim damages for his emotional distress under the Price-Anderson Act;


3. Whether or not Golden can claim physical damages under State Laws; and


4. Whether or not Golden can claim emotional damages under State Laws.

On the first issue, Golden must necessarily prove:

• General Causation - that he was exposed to dangerous chemicals which could have caused the physical injuries; and


• Specific Causation – that his exposure to the chemicals really did cause injuries.

Golden presented Dr. Wilkinson, his physician, as his witness. Initially, Dr. Wilkinson cannot prove that Golden had indeed suffered physical injuries. He said that he had to work on assumptions and must consider potential causes in order to treat his patient. However, medical assumptions do not establish causation.

After several months, Dr. Wilkinson offered another opinion. He opined that Golden’s chemical exposure had shown adverse health effects. But Golden’s exposure to chemicals was not limited to the May 20, 2002 incident. According to the physician, it is likely that Golden was chronically exposed to toxic due to his years of working in the facility without protective equipment.

Unfortunately, petitioner did not state in his claims that CH2M was liable for his chronic exposure. His claim was only limited to his May 20, 2002 exposure.

Golden was unsuccessful in proving specific causation. Thus, the Court affirms the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of CH2M.

On the second issue, Golden based his claim on the Price-Anderson Act. However, claims under the said act are only compensable if the victim’s exposure to radioactive materials caused physical injuries. As much as Golden failed to prove his physical injuries, the summary judgment granted to CH2M as to Golden’s emotional distress is proper.

On the third issue, the Court explained that the May 20, 2002 accident wasn’t just a nuclear incident covered by the Price-Anderson Act. The toxic waste also contained non-radioactive heavy metals. His physical damages claim resulting from exposure to non-nuclear substances is independent of and separate from his physical damages claim for radioactive materials. Thus, his second physical damages claim would not be preempted by the Price-Anderson Act.

However, since Golden failed to prove that he suffered physical injury resulting from the accident, he cannot claim physical damages based on State Laws on Injury.

Finally, the Court nevertheless concluded that Golden could possibly collect damages resulting from emotional distress from exposure to non-radioactive heavy metals. If Golden could present sufficient evidence showing that he suffered emotional distress because of his exposure to non-nuclear heavy metals, he could possibly make a case under State Law. Being separate and distinct from the emotional distress claim resulting from exposure to radioactive materials, the second claim cannot be preempted by the Price-Anderson Act.

In the same vein, Cindy Golden can also prove that she suffered emotional distress resulting from her husband’s exposure to non-radioactive materials. If she can successfully prove such, her loss of consortium case will not be preempted by the Act and will eventually prosper.

The Court of Appeals, therefore vacate the District Court’s order dismissing Daniel’s claim for emotional distress resulting from exposure to non-radioactive heavy metals; and Cindy’s loss of consortium claim.

The case is therefore remanded back to the District Court.