Hammond v. County of Los Angeles
Filed January 18, 2008, Second District, Div. Five
Cite as 2008 SOS 484

Teacher’s Discrimination Claims Affirmed

Yvonne Hammond was a nursing instructor employed by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. In early 2002, Hammond was removed from the classroom shortly after Betty Brennan, a new supervisor, was assigned to her unit.

According to Hammond, Brennan told her she was too old to stay in the classroom, and younger instructors needed the opportunity to gain classroom experience.

In mid-2002, Hammond met with Brennan’s supervisor to complain, an action which apparently angered Brennan.

In October 2003, Hammond complained again to another supervisor regarding the treatment she was receiving from Brennan. She cited comments made by Brennan and maintained that the supervisor was racially prejudiced against African-American employees. The department had the complaint investigated by an internal unit responsible for discrimination issues.

The department later issued a letter to Hammond acknowledging her complaint and finding her allegations to be founded.

Hammond filed a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing in July 2004. She later received a right to sue letter.

Hammond filed charges against Brennan and the Los Angeles County for several counts of race discrimination, harassment, and retaliation. Hammond also complained that the defendants took away virtually all her teaching assignments based on her age and race.

The county and Brennan sought summary judgment, contending that Hammond’s race and age discrimination and racial harassment claims were time-barred as based on acts that occurred before July 2003.

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the county and Brennan.

Hammond asked for a re-trial to seek reconsideration based on the then-recent decision in Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028. The petition was granted.

On rehearing, the court excluded from evidence the letter from the Department informing Hammond that her allegations were deemed “founded.” The court concluded the letter was inadmissible pursuant to Penal Code §832.7.

The court again granted Brennan’s and the county’s summary judgment motions on all causes of action.

On review, the Second District court of appeals reversed in part the earlier decision, holding that there were triable issues of fact regarding Brennan’s discrimination and retaliation claims.

Initially, the appeals court noted that the letter from the Department was inadmissible pursuant to §832.7. Hammond disagreed.

However, the court concluded it was unnecessary because Hammond submitted evidence that the conduct occurred within FEHA’s one-year limitations period.

In addition, the evidence showed that the alleged actionable conduct, namely the reduction of Hammond’s classroom teaching assignments, began in early 2002 and continued after July 1, 2003.

To support this assertion, the appeals court cited two facts:

1. The existence of past acts, known to the employee, does not bar charges about related discrete acts that are independently discriminatory and timely filed.


2. An employee is not barred from using the prior acts as background evidence in support of a timely claim.

In using this approach, the appeals court adopted the reasoning of the U.S. Supreme Court in National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan (2002) 536 U.S. 101, which declared that “an act within the limitations period in furtherance of racial discrimination or retaliation is a discrete act not barred by limitations, and evidence of conduct outside the limitations period is admissible as relevant background evidence to demonstrate an unlawful motivation”.

In determining the existence of triable issues of fact for race discrimination, the appeals court noted two issues:

1. There was evidence that Brennan substantially reduced Hammond’s teaching assignments, including those after July 1, 2003, potentially relegating her to a lesser status than full-time classroom instructor.


2. This was an adverse employment action for which no nondiscriminatory motive was established. Instead, the presumption of discrimination arising from Hammond’s prima facie showing went unrebutted.

In the triable issues of fact for racial harassment, evidence also showed that Brennan made harassing comments and reduced her teaching assignments, among other things, resulting in conditions sufficiently severe and pervasive enough to alter the conditions of her employment. This reflected possible actionable racial harassment.

The same was true regarding Hammond’s age discrimination claim, as she testified that Brennan sought to demote her, wanted younger instructors in the classroom, and hired younger instructors to replace her.

And finally, the appeals court noted that the Brennan’s comments following the complaints incident were sufficient to support a reasonable inference of retaliation for adverse employment actions against Hammond that later occurred within the limitations period for her retaliation claims.

The Second Appellate District therefore reversed a judgment in part, holding that the Fair Employment and Housing Act’s statute of limitations did not bar all claims asserted by a plaintiff whose allegations of ongoing employment discrimination included discrete actionable conduct that occurred within the governing one-year limitations period.