Henry v. Superior Court (Reinink)
Filed February 25, 2008, Second District, Division Seven
Cite as 2008 SOS 1239

Writ of Mandate Granted to Tort Defendant Seeking Shared Liability

In April 3, 2003, Larry Reinink was hired by the Joe and Judy Henry to clean and repair their swimming pool and its equipment. He worked from mid-afternoon until dark. As he was leaving, Reinink had a trip and fall accident caused by an unmarked, unlit concrete step along the walkway between the pool and an access gate at the south end of the property.

As a result, the accident left Reinink with an injured shoulder. Paramedics arrived and took Reinink to the emergency room of Kaiser Hospital where he was treated. Thereafter, Reinink underwent a series of surgeries to further treat his injury.

Following that incident, Reinink sued the Henrys for his injuries.

During trial, the Henrys sought to introduce evidence that Reinink’s injuries were worsened by the medical treatment he received at Kaiser Hospital immediately following the accident.

The trial court rejected the evidence offered, ruling that such evidence was inadmissible.

In response, the Henrys petitioned for a writ of mandate and asked the trial to vacate its order preventing them from presenting evidence of Kaiser’s negligence. In addition, the Henrys also asked the court to issue a new order and sought an immediate stay of trial proceedings.

On July 23, 2007, all trial court proceedings were stopped.

In review, the court of appeal granted the Henrys’ petition for writ of mandate. The court also asserted that the Henrys were entitled to introduce evidence of Kaiser’s negligence to limit their liability for non-economic damages to their percentage of fault. (Civil Code §1431.2)

Further, the court explained that Proposition 51 eliminates joint liability for non-economic damages where liability is based on comparative fault.

It cited the following provision, §1431.2(a):

“In any action for personal injury, property damage, or wrongful death, based upon principles of comparative fault, the liability of each defendant for non-economic damages shall be several only and shall not be joint. Each defendant shall be liable only for the amount of non-economic damages allocated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant’s percentage of fault, and a separate judgment shall be rendered against that defendant for that amount.”

In this way, parties may only be held jointly liable for economic damages, but not for non-economic damages where comparative fault is limited to several only.

Further, the court held that the tortfeasor is liable not only for the victim’s original personal injuries but also for the aggravated injury caused by subsequent negligent medical treatment.

Accordingly, the court held that although the Kaiser physicians could not be held liable for liable that portion, they shared liability with the Henrys for any subsequent injury Reinink suffered following the treatment.

Thus, if the Henrys were found liable to Reinink, they would be entitled to file a separate action seeking partial equitable indemnification from Kaiser with respect to those damages for which they and Kaiser were jointly and severally liable.

On the other hand, the court rejected Reinink’s contention that the Henrys’ liability for the injuries which was aggravated by Kaiser’s negligence was “imputed” or “derivative” and thus outside the rules for several liability adopted by Prop. 51 based on the following grounds:

• the Henrys’ potential liability was based on culpable conduct and their fault, along with that of the Kaiser physicians, could be evaluated, measured and compared


• Proposition 15 §1431.2 permitted them to limit their liability for non-economic damages to their proportionate share of fault.

The Second Appellate District court therefore granted the petition for writ of mandate.