James Crawford vs. City of Los Angeles
Filed 6/24/09
Second Appellate District
Cite as B210821

CA Reverses Court’s Decision about POBRA’s One-Year Statute of Limitations

James Crawford was a detective in the Los Angeles City Police Department. On May 3, 2006, the Department served him with a complaint that charged him with six counts of misconduct:

• Count 1 alleged that on September 14, 2004, he inappropriately identified himself as a Los Angeles Police detective while he was off duty.
• Count 2 alleged that between September 14 and October 12, 2004, he engaged in outside employment without a valid work permit.
• Counts 3 through 5 alleged that on October 23, 2003, July 14, 2004, and January 13, 2005, Crawford accessed the Department’s computer system for non-duty related activities while on duty.
• Count 6 alleged that on November 17, 2005, he made false statements to Sergeants M. von Korff and D. DiMeglio, who were conducting an official investigation.

Crawford’s employment was terminated after an administrative hearing and an adverse decision by the Department’s Board of Rights, which found him guilty of six counts of misconduct.

The Board of Rights found Crawford guilty of counts 1, 2, and 4 through 6, and fixed his penalty as termination of employment with full loss of pay. The police chief executed an order to that effect on March 14, 2007.

Crawford brought a petition for peremptory writ of mandate challenging the guilty findings and seeking reinstatement and back pay. Crawford argued that all of the charges were barred by the one-year limitations period set forth in section 3304, subdivision (d), and the parallel provision of the City Charter.

He also contended the Board of Rights’ findings of guilt were not supported by the evidence adduced at the administrative hearing. He also asserted that the City forfeited its contention by failing to properly designate the transcript of the administrative record as part of the appellate record in accord with rule 8.123(b) of the California Rules of Court.

The trial court found the Department failed to comply with POBRA’s one-year limitations period (§ 3304, subd. (d)) with regard to five (1, 2, and 4-6) of the six counts of misconduct.

The trial court granted the petition in part, it found that Crawford could not be punished for five of the six acts of misconduct because the City did not complete its investigation of wrongdoing and notify Crawford within a year.

The City appealed, it argued that the trial court erred in ruling that counts 4-6 of the administrative charges were barred by the statute of limitations.

Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of counts 4 through 6 as being barred by POBRA’s one-year statute of limitations and remanded to the trial court to determine whether those claims are supported by the administrative record.

It held that counts 4 and 5 the court made a mathematical error and those charges were not time barred. They also hold that count 6 (alleging a false statement during an investigation) is not time barred.

• The facts supporting the misconduct charges in counts 4 and 5 (were discovered during a March 1, 2005 internal audit.
• The factual basis for count 6 (alleged false statements during an internal departmental investigation) was discovered during the course of the November 17, 2005 interview.

Thus, application of the court’s 183 days of tolling brings counts 4 and 5 within POBRA’s one-year period. Count 6 is within the statutory period without tolling.

Also, with regard to Crawford’s allegation that the City forfeited its contention by failing to properly designate the transcript of the administrative record, the CA ruled that a technical defalcation under the facts of this case is hardly the equivalent of failing to provide this court with a complete record.

The CA also ruled that Alameida v. State Personnel Bd. (2004) cannot be applied to Crawford’s case. Unlike the situation in Alameida, Crawford’s false statements which were the basis for the charge in count 6 were made before the one-year statute of limitations expired.

The Court further held that the City has the power to determine the causes for which an employee may be terminated from employment, provided POBRA’s applicable statute of limitations is satisfied.