Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare System, LP
Filed February 13, 2008
Cite as 06-55280
NINTH U.S. CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

Decision on Discrimination Affirmed

Christopher Lynn Johnson was employed as a physician at the Riverside Community Hospital (Riverside). He became a member of the Medical Staff of Riverside from October 1999 until February 2002. He identifies himself as an African-American and bisexual.

The terms of his professional service agreement provides the following:

• Johnson was explicitly designated as “Contractor” rather than an employee.


• He was required to retain membership and privileges with the Medical Staff. Otherwise, he shall be terminated.

When he failed to pay his membership fees, his privileges were revoked. Eventually, he was terminated.

When he asked for reinstatement, he was informed that he could only do so if he would apply as a new applicant and a hearing before the Medical Staff Credentials Committee was required.

During the hearing, he was confronted with numerous complaints filed by his co-workers regarding his behavior. The Committee upheld the denial of Johnson’s Medical Staff membership.

Prior to the termination of the hearing, Riverside filed a report with the Medical Board describing the complaints against Johnson. The latter argued that such filing was premature and denied him future opportunities for employment.

California Department of Fair Employment and Housing, upon Johnson’s complaint, issued him the right-to-sue notices upon allegations of harassment, denial of employment and denial of the privileges to admit patients to Riverside on account of his race and sexual orientation.

Due to such notices, Johnson filed a complaint before California state court against Riverside and several other defendants alleging multiple civil rights claims under federal and state law. However, he voluntarily dismissed that action. Instead, he filed a complaint with District Court for the Central District of California against Riverside, the Medical Staff, Duncanson, the Chief of Medical Staff and other individuals alleging the same causes of action including:

• racial discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981;


• racial and sexual orientation discrimination in violation of California Civil Code § 51 (the “Unruh Civil Rights Act claim”) and § 51.5;


• racial and sexual orientation discrimination in violation of California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”), Cal. Gov’t. Code §§ 12.

Johnson specifically alleged one particular serious incident of discrimination. This is his encounter with Dr. Vlasak, in which Vlasak used a racial epithet (“You fucking nigger—why did you do that to me?”) and moved as if to strike him.

Defendants moved for the dismissal of all claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b) (1) and 12(b) (6).

The district court dismissed Johnson’s claims under California Civil Code §§ 51 and 51.5 with prejudice holding that he had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because neither provision creates a cause of action for employment discrimination. The district court also dismissed his other claims such as FEHA claims, without prejudice, granting him leave to amend.

Johnson arrived at a settlement with several defendants leaving only Riverside Duncanson, and the Medical Staff as defendants in this action. Due to this development, the district court dismissed each of his remaining claims under Rule 12(b) (6) for failure to state a claim.

On appeal, Johnson raised the following errors:

• Dismissal of his § 1981 claims against all three defendants alleging that he raised a triable issue of fact of defendants creating a racially hostile work environment


• Dismissing his §§ 51 and 51.5 claims because both recognize a cause of action for the type of workplace discrimination.
• Dismissal of his FEHA claims against all three defendants even though the statute of limitations expired as he was entitled to equitable tolling.

The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals made the following findings:

• no indication that Johnson was subjected to racial discrimination on any other occasion aside from the incident with Dr. Vlasak. Said incident was not considered so “severe or pervasive” to raise a triable issue of fact to alter the terms of his employment. It did not create an abusive work environment in violation of his right.


• Johnson’s relationship with defendant hospital whereby he is paid a monthly sum to be on call as an emergency physician plus a per-patient fee for rendering treatment subject to a monthly cap was "materially indistinguishable" from an employment relationship. Such arrangement precluded plaintiff's discrimination claims for discriminatory treatment in an economic relationship.


• Plaintiff is not entitled to FEHA claims under the principles of equitable tolling and equitable estoppel. Such denial is due to the fact that the FEHA limitations period already expired.

Wherefore premises considered, the appellate court affirmed  the district court’s dismissal of  Johnson’s claims against the defendants under § 1981 and under California Civil Code §§ 51 and 51.5 for failure to state a claim and the district court’s dismissal of his  FEHA claims for failure to comply with the statute of limitations.