Prince v. Sutter Health Central
Filed April 4, 2008, Third District
Cite as 2008 SOS 2037

Decision on Summary Judgment Affirmed

Plaintiffs are the widow and daughters of the deceased James Prince. The latter killed himself after his release from Sutter Health Central (Sutter).

Due to such tragedy, plaintiffs sued two sets of defendants for improperly releasing James. One of them is Kaiser.

The deceased had health coverage with Kaiser. Kaiser subcontracted mental health services to Sutter Health Central, which employed Juliet Stevenson (Stevenson), who allegedly made the decision to release the deceased.

While Plaintiffs settled with Kaiser under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act, it, however, continued the suit against Sutter. They claimed that Stevenson’s acts did not fall under MICRA and therefore they could recover further no economic damages from Stevenson and Sutter.

The trial court ruled against the Plaintiffs when they moved for summary adjudication of the MICRA issue and granted Sutter’s motion for summary judgment.

Plaintiffs timely appealed from said judgment.

The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s decision based on the following grounds:

Stevenson was a "licensed or certified" healthcare professional entitled to the protections of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act. This has been reinforced by the fact that she was registered with the Board of Behavioral Sciences. Her being registered is equal to being licensed or certified pursuant to the following grounds:

1. Under the Business and Professions Code, license means, “license, certificate, registration, or other means to engage in a business or profession regulated by this code or referred to in Section 1000 or 3600.” As her profession is regulated by that code, in effect, she was licensed.


2. The case of Chosak v. Alameda County Medical Center is not applicable in the instant case. The court, in deciding Chosak made the following conclusions:
   
   
   • The term “licensed or certified” was ambiguous. It is susceptible of two readings, each of which plausibly accounted for the grammar employed by the Legislature. However, as applied in this instant case, the appeal court disagreed with Chosak’s view that both possible readings stand in equipoise. MICRA’s purpose would be defeated by eliminating its protections from persons, such as Stevenson, lawfully practicing a healing art as part of their training to become licensed. Plaintiffs’ reliance on cases emphasizing the importance of licensure of medical does not change this view.
   
   
   • Plaintiffs would distinguish Chosak on the ground that Stevenson was not lawfully practicing a healing art. This was couched as a claim that she was acting outside the scope of professional services, in that, she:
     
     
     • was not receiving the supervision required by law; and
     
     
     • did not disclose to Mr. and Mrs. Prince that she was not licensed — a disclosure required by law.

Because of these two statutory violations, Stevenson did not commit the ‘professional negligence’ to which section 3333.2 applies.

In sum, since MICRA applies to Stevenson, plaintiffs have been compensated by the Kaiser settlement and have no triable issues against Sutter.