Quihuis v. City of Los Angeles
Filed January 28, 2008, Second District, Division One
Cite as 2008 SOS 644

Decision on Dismissed Police Officer Reversed

On November 18, 2003, Robert Quihuis, a police officer with the City of Los Angeles, found an unmarked police car parked in front of his garage when he returned home. He was off duty that time.

Apparently, Robert Emmerson, a deputy sheriff, was conducting an interview. Quihuis asked the officer to move the car. Emmerson told Quihuis the car would be moved as soon as possible, and resumed his interviews. Quihuis requested twice more to have the police car moved. The two had a little discussion in which Emmerson admitted to cursing Quihuis.

Quihuis introduced himself as a police officer. Eventually, the police car was moved. Quihuis complained by phone to Emmerson’s department.

Following that episode, Emmerson prepared a report on the incident. The sheriff’s department sent a copy of Emmerson’s report to the Los Angeles Police Department. On October 7, 2004, Quihuis received a notice of hearing on the charge that he had interfered with a police investigation.

After the hearing, Quihuis was found guilty and discharged from the police force. He petitioned for writ of mandate, citing §3304(d) and contending that the notice of hearing did not give him notice of his possible termination.

In response, the city argued that the notice of hearing also served as a notice of possible termination in itself by its reference to municipal law giving the hearing board authority to recommend penalties, including termination.

Consequently, the trial court denied his petition for writ of mandate. Quihuis appealed the decision of the trial court.

In reviewing the decision, the Second District court of appeal reversed the ruling, holding that the personnel complaint did not give Quihuis proper notice. As such, the court based its decision on the following grounds:

• Under §3304(d), the city was required to provide timely notice of the proposed disciplinary action. In this case, the complaint did not identify any proposed disciplinary action at all, and therefore did not satisfy the statutory requirement.


• The court found that the notice’s reference to municipal law authorizing penalties was insufficient. Section §3304(d) requires notice of proposed discipline, not merely advice that some discipline was contemplated.

Further, the appeals court found that the city violated police officer’s right to receive notice of the specific proposed disciplinary action against him within the one-year statute of limitations contained in Government Code Sec. 3304(d) “where officer was notified within one-year period that a complaint had been filed against him”. Instead, Quihuis was not notified within that time regarding any specific disciplinary action the city might take.

The Second Appellate District therefore reversed a judgment which held that the police officer removed from his position was not provided with ‘unambiguous’ notice of proposed disciplinary action against him within the one-year limitations period.