Sun v. City of Oakland
In the Court of Appeal of the State of California
15 September 2008
A118434 (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG05-229302)

Third-party Conduct vis-à-vis “Dangerous Condition” of a Public Property

This is a case filed by a grieving husband against a City allegedly because of a dangerous condition of the intersection where the accident and death of the husband’s wife occurred.

The accident happened in the International Boulevard. It is a four-lane thoroughfare with two lanes going in each direction. One night, Ms Peng, the wife, attempted to cross International Boulevard where it intersects with 7th Avenue. The crosswalk was formerly marked with painted stripes but it was unmarked at the time of the accident.

A driver proceeding in the left lane of International Boulevard saw Ms Peng from about a block away and stopped to allow her to cross. But as she emerged from behind the stopped car and crossed into the right lane, she was stuck by a car driven by Ramon Jackson.

It appeared that Jackson had initially been driving in the left lane, but he moved his car to the right lane in order to get around the stopped car and did not see Ms Peng crossing in his path until it was too late to stop.

The husband, Sun, together with his children, petitioners in this case, filed a complaint against the City of Oakland. They theorized that Ms Peng’s death was caused by a dangerous condition of public property.

Specifically, they alleged that:

“Decedent was crossing the street at the corner of International Boulevard and 7thAvenue, near the Clinton Park Adult School. The intersection in which decedent was walking used to have in place a painted crosswalk for pedestrians for several years prior to this incident. However, sometime prior to the subject incident the City of Oakland repaved the roadway and never replaced the crosswalk. Decedent was walking across this street when she was struck and killed in the unmarked crosswalk. In April of 2005, the crosswalk was finally replaced.”

The City moved for a summary judgment on the following grounds:

1. The intersection was not in a dangerous condition as a matter of law


2. The undisputed evidence shows that no dangerous condition of public property caused the accident


3. Even if a dangerous condition did cause the accident, City was immune by operation of Government Code Sections 830.4 and 830.8.

The trial court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment finding that:

1. The site of the accident was not in a dangerous condition


2. There was no evidence the accident was caused by City’s earlier removal of the crosswalk markings


3. There was no triable issue of material fact as to whether City was immune from liability.

Sun et al appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeal of the State of California, hence, this instant case.

In affirming the decision of the trial against the petitioners, the Court held, in substance that “A public entity may be liable for a dangerous condition of public property even where the immediate cause of a plaintiff’s injury is a third party’s negligent or illegal act …if some physical characteristic of the property exposes its users to increased danger from third party negligence or criminality. [Citation] But it is insufficient to show only harmful third party conduct, like the conduct of a motorist.”

“[T]hird party conduct by itself, unrelated to the condition of the property, does not constitute a ‘dangerous condition’ for which a public entity may be held liable.” [Citation] There must be a defect in the physical condition of the property and that defect must have some causal relationship to the third party conduct that injures the plaintiff. [Citation] ‘[P]ublic liability lies under [Government Code] section 835 only when a feature of the public property has “increased or intensified” the danger to users from third party conduct.’[Citation]”

The Court held that the removal of the existing crosswalk markings and installation of sidewalk extensions to lessen the distance pedestrian needed to traverse to cross street did not support a reasonable inference that removal of markings increased risk of accidents. Neither does it mean that the intersection was in a dangerous condition on public property.