Wences v. City of Los Angeles
Filed September 2, 2009
Cite as 2009 SOS 5533

Case must be tried under an Independent Judgment Standard

Cesar Wences had been employed by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) for five years and held a rank of Police Officer II.

A woman later identified as Edie Rodriguez (Rodriguez) constantly calling Wences’ residence to speak with a relative leaving in the latter’s household. Eventually, Rodriguez became hostile over the telephone. Wences’ wife became afraid but Wences did not consider Rodriguez’s threats to be credible at that time.

Minutes later, Rodriguez and three others showed up in front of Wences’ porch. Wences, who was off-duty, showed up with his service firearm placed in a “low ready” position. Rodriguez began advancing on Wences’ wife by calling her names.

When Wences saw a silver object in Rodriguez’s hand, he fired a warning shot believing it to be a knife. As soon as Wences fired a shot, Rodriguez fled. The three others were taken by the police. Soon, Rodriguez was also arrested. In the whole ordeal, Wences was never treated as a suspect but a crime victim.

Due to his off-duty shooting incident, LAPD convened a mandatory Use of Force Review Board (Board) to assess Wences’ act. The Board was responsible for finding “in policy” or “out of policy” as to the drawing and using of the firearm. The Board was also tasked to make recommendations of “no action,” “training,” or “administrative disapproval.”

The Board found that the use of force in discharging the firearm was “in policy” but the drawing and exhibition of the firearm prior to the shooting was “out of policy”. Hence, the board recommended to Chief Bratton that Wences be given an “administrative disapproval”.

Eventually, Wence’s commanding officer recommended an official reprimand on him. Wences filed an administrative appeal asking the LAPD to reclassify the “out of policy” finding to “in policy” and removing the official reprimand to his record. The hearing officer sustained the finding and upheld the penalty of official reprimand.

Consequently, Wences filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate in Los Angeles County Superior Court alleging that the administrative findings that he had committed an act of misconduct was not supported by evidence. Wences sought an order setting aside the charges of misconduct against him and the official reprimand.

After trial, the court, in applying the substantial evidence standard of review, denied Wences writ petition on the ground that there existed a substantial evidence to support the administrative decision.

On appeal, the California Appeal Court reversed the judgment and the case was reprimanded to the trial court.

The court ruled that a written reprimand, which would have a negative effect on Wences’ future opportunities for promotion and most desirable assignments, should have been reviewed by trial court under an independent judgment standard.

This was true even though the penalty did not immediately affect Wences’ rank or compensation so long as it substantially affected Wences’ fundamental employment rights.